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What’s  the  problem  with  free  will?
The	   debate	   about	   the	   existence	   of	   free	   will	   is	   often	   referred	  
to	   as	   “the	   free	   will	   problem”.	   However,	   this	   essay	   intends	   to	  
illustrate	   that	   “the	   free	   will	   problem”	   may	   not	   exist	   after	   all	  
but	   that	  discussions	  about	   free	  will	  suffer	   from	  a	  multitude	  of	  
about	  the	  nature	  of	  free	  will	  and	  are	  often	  too	  general.	  Support	  
studies	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   suffer	   from	  methodological	  
limitations	   and	   allow	   multiple	   interpretations	   depending	   on	  
of	  undermining	  the	  belief	   in	  moral	  responsibility	  in	  society	  by	  
premature	  public	  discussions.	  
	   “The”	   problem	   of	   free	   will	   is	   therefore,	   according	   to	   this	  
essay,	  that	  inter-­‐	  and	  intra-­‐disciplinary	  teamwork	  in	  this	  debate	  
science.	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INTRODUCTION
The  existence  of  free  will  has  been  debated  amongst  philosophers  for  decades.  This  
debate  has  drastic  implications  for  every  individual  as  it  is  most  natural  for  humans  
actions.  Many  (if  not  most)  individuals  would  feel  deeply  uncomfortable  if  this  is  
not  the  case  since  it  would  mean  that  they  perform  actions  and  express  wishes  that  
they  do  not  generate  consciously,  not  unlike  a  puppet.  
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   At  the  same  time  the  nonexistence  of  free  will  is  often  claimed  to  be  a  threat  
to  society  and  to  require  fundamental  changes  in  its  penal  system  since  wrongdoers  
cannot  be  held  accountable  for  their  actions   if  they  are  not  masters  of  their  will.  
existence  of  free  will  altogether  implies  that  nobody  could  be  held  responsible  or  
punishable  for  anything.  The  mere  thought  that  crimes  like  murder  or  rape  would  
not  even  be  attempted  to  be  prosecuted  is  dreadful.  
mirrored  by  the  eagerness  to  discuss  this  matter:  the  search  term  “free  will”  yields  
19,000,000  hits   in  google,   3,590,000  hits   in  google  books,   263,000  hits   in  google  
scholar,  and  4,741  hits   in  ScienceDirect   (19.04.2013).  While   the  chosen  databases  
are  only  examples  and   these   numbers  are  only  approximate,   the  order  of   hits   is  
informative  enough  to  imagine  the  dimensions  of  this  debate.  
often  cited  from  critics  as  proof  for  the  claim  of  free  will  being  an  illusion.  Yet,  what  
  This  paper  aims  to  elucidate  some  problems  associated  with  the  debate  about  free  
will  and  tries  to  assess  their  potential.  Is  the  non-­‐existence  of  free  will  supported  
empirically?  What  does  the  debate  mean  to  society?  And  more  importantly:  What  
is  being  debated,   in  other  words:  what  exactly   is   free  will?  Some  answers  will  be  
given  in  this  essay,  in  particular  by  showing  that  the  answer  to  the  last  question  is  
far  from  easy.  
experiments  with  regard  to  free  will  and  their  limitations.  The  third  section  discusses  
possible  issues  for  society  arising  from  the  current  debate.  Lastly,  a  summary  with  
conclusions  completes  the  essay.  
WHAT  EXACTLY  IS  FREE  WILL?  PROBLEMS  WITH  DEFINITIONS  AND  
THEORIES  
While  the  meaning  of  free  will  seems  intuitive  for  most  humans,  it  is  not  easy  to  give  
free  will  with  regard  to  moral  responsibility  and  its  existence,  mostly  by  referring  to  
common  views  including  (in)compatibilism,  (in)determinism,  libertarianism  and  
subtypes  thereof  (for  an  overview  see  Pockett,  2007).  Yet,  few  philosophers  describe  
the  
determine  how  arguments  are  used  and  what  exactly  it  is  that  is  being  discussed;  
many  times  this  seems  not  to  be  taken  into  account.  Neither  intending  to  summarize  
all  possible  opinions  nor  to  argue  for  or  against  any  perspective,  a  few  accounts  on  
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Problems  due  to  different  assumptions  about  free  will
Some  philosophers,  the  most   famous  being  Descartes  (see  The  sixth  Meditation,  
translated  by  Moriarty,  2008),  separate   free  will   from  matter  and  describe   it  as  a  
metaphysical  force  from  which  thoughts  and  actions  originate.  This  dualistic  view  is  
clearly  fairly  mysterious,  neither  possible  to  prove,  nor  easy  to  disprove  completely.  
Others,  like  Wegner,  describe  free  will  as  a  feeling,  sensation  or  emotion,  “not  unlike  
happiness  or  sadness…”  (Wegner,  2004,  p.658).  This  way,  Wegner  argues,  acts  are  
attributed  to  the  self  in  a  post-­‐hoc  manner  which  makes  free  will  illusory.  The  logic  
is  that  if  the   is   with  and  occurs  before  the  movement  and  if  there  
the  thought  led  to  the  movement“  (Hallett,  2007,  p.1182).  
   While  he  does  not  distinguish  properly  between  feeling,  sensation,  emotion,  
or   percept,   Gray   Hardcastle   illustrates   the   importance   of   exact   wording.   She  
to  viewing  free  will  only  as  a  perception)  reshapes  arguments  about  free  will.
   Yet  others,  mostly  compatibilists  like  Frankfurt,  link  free  will  to  decisions  or  
choices  and  thus  ability   (for  overview  of  compatibilism  see  Campbell,   2011).   It   is  
important  to  distinguish  this  account  from  the  other  in  that  decisions  necessarily  
precede   actions,   a   feature   that   has   important   implications   for   arguments   about  
feeling  may  be  mistaken  in  certain  situations  and  also  explain  some  of  the  function  
that  free  will  may  have.  
arguments  about  exceptional  cases  and   thus  make   them  generally  valid   (i.e.   the  
applied  is  rarely  discussed  although  this  is  a  crucial  component:  Is  it  necessarily  a  
“The  earliest   initiation  of  action  process”  or   “the  choice  or  selection  of  a     
action”  (Haggard  &  Libet,  2001,  abstract.  Bold  print  in  original  instead  of  italics)?    
   When  does  free  will  develop  (or  does  everyone  possess  it  from  birth)?  Does  
everyone  possess  free  will  (e.g.,  children,  easily  manipulable  individuals,  cognitively  
impaired  or  mentally  disordered)?  Under  what  circumstances  is  one  capable  to  exert  
  (e.g.,  being   in   love,  exceptional  emotional  
situations,   physical   conditions   like   hunger   or   sleep   lack,   substance   abuse,   peer  
pressure,  brain  tumors)?  
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to  impose  certain  restrictions  otherwise  discussion  may  be  strangled  by  arguments  
about  physical  needs  (e.g.,  mild  hunger  when  shopping  interfering  with  choices)  
and   impulsivity.   Restricting   free   will   to   higher-­‐order   processes   would   help   to  
clarify  discussion  grounds  and  avoid  debates  about  ambiguous  situations.  At  the  
same  time,  even  such  a  restriction  may  be  too  vague  because  emotions  and  context  
specify  the  type  of  decisions  in  question  and  the  degree  of  being  informed  about  the  
because  of  the  limited  choice  possibilities  of  a  situation.  Examples  demonstrating  
are   plentiful   (even   if   budget   is   unlimited,   certain   desired   things   may   not   be  
available).  This  makes  it  questionable  that  true  “no-­‐constraints  situations”  exist  in  
a  nonutopian  world  and  thus  precision  is  needed  in  such  statements.  Would  it  be  
be  an  entire  discussion  on  its  own;  the  example  is  only  mentioned  here  to  illustrate  
confounded  with  freedom.
   The   previous   point   was   raised   about   external   coercion   (or   constraining)  
factors.  What  about  internal  factors:  Could  one  not  argue  that  past  experience  or  
physical  needs  already  dictate?  If  so,  one  could  object  that  a  person  will  never  be  
internal   coercion   factors   since   the   person   may   have   actively   decided   to   adopt  
is  expected  (since  they  are  generated  by  the  same  person)  but  at  what  point  is  the  
line  crossed  to  favor  determinism?  
Haggard,  2004)  instead  of  an  active  decision  (free  will).
questions  are  bound  to  be  discussed  but  these   jigsaw  elements  are  spread   in  the  
literature,  not  agreed  on  and  often  omitted  all  together.
of  free  will  and  possible  limitations  need  to  be  addressed.  This  may  be  tedious  but  
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will  only  hamper  progress.
and   interpretations,   as   the   next   section   will   show,   which   makes   it   clear   that   a  
empirical  experiments.  
PROBLEMS  OF  NEUROSCIENCE  WITH  EMPIRICAL  INQUIRIES  ABOUT  
FREE  WILL
with  respect  to  their  limitations.  While  this  seems  so  obvious  that  it  is  hardly  worth  
mentioning,  limitations  of  interpretations  are  often  left  aside  in  debates  about  free  
in   this   section   followed   by   some   theoretical   and  methodological   considerations  
against  the  common  interpretation  of  this  and  similar  results.  
The  ‘classic  Libet  experiment’
In   almost   any   introductory   part   in   articles   about   free   will,   the   so   called   “Libet  
recordings   from  subjects,  who  were   told   to  make  a  voluntary  key  press  at  a   time  
of  their  choice,  Libet  and  colleagues  showed  readiness  potentials  1  second  prior  to  
own  awareness  of  his  or  her  decision.  To  show  this  temporal  component  of  their  
with  either  left  or  right  hand.  They  found  that  the  readiness  potential  was  indicative  
of  the  choice  and  occurred  prior  to  the  time  of  becoming  aware  of  the  decision,  as  
Similar   experiments   have   been   carried   out   using   single-­‐neuron   recordings   and  
fMRI  but  this  experiment  is  by  far  the  most  cited  paper  in  these  discussions.  Yet,  
comparatively  few  articles  mention  the  limitations  or  doubts  against  the  common  
interpretation  of  his  data.  Interestingly,  Libet  himself  did  not  claim  to  have  proven  
the  non-­‐  existence  of  free  will.  On  the  contrary,  he  explains  that  the  movements  of  
the  subjects  could  be  initiated  subconsciously  and  that  while  such  a  decision  may  
be  generated  without  the  subject  being  aware,  the  mind  still  possesses  a  veto  power  
to  not  execute  the  act   (Libet,   1999).   In  this  respect  Libet  seems  to  subscribe  to  a  
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conclusions.  
   There  is  the  possibility  that  the  activity  measured  (either  by  EEG  or  fMRI  or  
electrophysiologically)  
  (Trevena  &Miller,  2002).  This  process  may  again  consist  
of  both  subconscious  and  conscious  components,  all  of  which  makes  temporal  data  
(e.g.,  by  EEG)  uninterpretable  in  terms  of  what  activity  represents  free  will  or  what  
is  predictive  of  free  will.  
fMRI  or  single-­‐cell  recordings  does  not  even  necessarily  mean  that  dualistic  believes  
need   to   be   abandoned   because   it   is   known   (e.g.,   from   neurofeedback)   that   the  
(Stier,  2011,  p.  990.  translation).  Does  
entanglement   of   the   various   (sub)conscious   components   in   a   complex   decision  
process,  this  seems  to  resemble  a  hen-­‐egg  question.  Moreover  while  results  may  be  
found  that  explain  certain  features,  Roskies  argues  that  neuroscience  is  not  in  the  
position  to     (Roskies,  2006,  
p.421).
which  should  at  least  caution  against  absolute  claims  (that  free  will  is  an  illusion)  
without  the  need  to  refer  to  methodological  weaknesses;  a  selection  of  these  will  
nevertheless  be  mentioned  in  the  following.
One  potential  methodological  weakness  is  the  choice  of  tasks  in  these  experiments.  
As  Haggard  notes,  participants  are  usually  asked  to  make  decisions  about  personally  
irrelevant  or  meaningless  choices,  such  as  right  or   left  key  presses.  Thus,  there  is  
“generally  no  reason  or  value  that  motivates  the  participant  to  choose  one  action  
over  another”  (Haggard,  2008,  p.  934),  which  may  mean  that  there  was  no  need  for  
the  participant  to  have  any  free  will  in  these  moments.  It  follows  that  tasks  may  need  
to  involve  higher-­‐cognitive  decisions;  a  point  that  is  also  relevant  when  reviewing  
animal  studies  on  free  will.  Nevertheless,  even  when  the  tasks  get  more  complex  or  
closer  to  everyday  life,  the  argument  may  remain  that  the  situation  is  a  laboratory-­‐
one  and  therefore  too  well  controlled  by  the  subject  (Stier,  2011),  who,  in  addition,  
   Further,   it   is  questionable  whether   the   temporal  components  measured  are  
which   may   completely   misrepresent  
temporal  order   (Trevena,  &  Miller,   2002).  Further   inaccuracy  may  be   introduced  
by   i.e.,  delay  which  is  introduced  when  the  person  indicates  
the  time  point  of  the  decision  (Trevena  &  Miller,  2002).  Similarly,  there  has  been  
research,  showing  that  the  “subjective  present  is  actually  slightly  in  the  real  past”  
(Hallett,  2007,  p.4).  
   On  top  of  that,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  temporal  resolution  of  the  methods  
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to  study  brain  activity  may  not  be  close  enough  to  the  resolution  needed.  This  is  sure  
for  fMRI  which  has  a  temporal  resolution  in  the  order  of  several  seconds.  However,  
despite  the  fact  that  the  temporal  resolution  of  EEG  in  miliseconds  is  fairly  good  one  
in   arguments   about   free  will.   For   fairness   it   should   be  mentioned   that   there   is  
methodological   weaknesses   (review   by   Stier,   2011).   The   best   methods   currently  
available  may  not  provide  satisfactory  quality  for  the  problem  studied.  Perhaps  it  
is  even   impossible   to  create  an  experimental  design   that   is  complex  enough  and  
immune  to  methodological  inaccuracies.  Is  neuroscience  able  to  advance  the  free  
will  discussions  at  all?  Even  though  neuroscience  did  not  achieve  reliable  evidence  
for  or  against  free  will  yet,  this  research  has  already  moved  a  mountain  by  initiating  
the  debate  has  come  to  a  consensus.  
PROBLEMS  EVOLVING  FOR  SOCIETY  FROM  FREE-­WILL  DISCUSSIONS
Without   a   doubt,   the   discussion   about   free   will   may   have   drastic   implications  
not  only   for   the  common   justice  system  but  also   for  every   individual.  While  this  
problem   has   the   potential   to   be   tremendous,   as   outlined   in   the   introduction,  
several  researchers  and  philosophers  claim  that  it  may  not  be  a  problem  after  all-­‐  at  
least  not  for  anyone  who  is  not  a  dualist  (Hallett,  2007).  Hallet  for  example  argues  
a  person  could  have  used   their  veto  power   to  prevent   the  action   from  execution  
(Libet,   1999),   which   would   still   make   them   responsible.   Again,   this   discussion  
seems  to  be  some  agreement  that  the  legal  system  should  not  be  changed.  If  so,  is  
   The  answer  is  no,  since  there  may  still  exist  a  problem  for  the  society  arising  
from  the  discussions  about  free  will  and  determinism.  When  Vohns  and  Schooler  
primed   participants   with   texts   on   determinism,   their   participants   cheated  
considerably  more  often  and  thus  were  led  to  behave  immorally  (Vohns  &  Schooler,  
2008).  Baumeister  and  colleagues  found  that  subjects  behave  more  aggressive  and  
less  social  after  being  primed  that  free  will  may  not  exist  (Baumeister  et  al.,  2009).
there  is  the  potential  for  great  harm  for  society  when  careless  phrases  and  incomplete  
discussions  (until  a  consensus  in  science  is  reached)  reach  a  non-­‐critical  audience.  
Some  individuals  in  such  an  audience  may  not  assess  such  discussions  correctly  and  
may  make  use  of  any  excuse  to  abandon  responsibility  for  misdeeds.
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‘THE’  PROBLEM  OF  FREE  WILL?  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION
This   last   section   summarizes   and   concludes   what   “the”   problem   of   free   will   is  
importance  in  order  to  advance  empirically.
   The   next   section   described   some   of   the   concerns   that   have   been   voiced  
There  have  been  considerable  theoretical  and  methodological  concerns  such  that  
current  empirical  data  are  neither  suitable  to  fully  support  contra  nor  pro  free  will  
arguments  at  this  stage.  Such  arguments  include  for  example  the  entanglement  of  
conscious  and  subconscious  components   in  the  decision  process  or  the  temporal  
interpretation  of  data,  or  the  type  of  tasks  in  these  experiments.  The  problem  is  thus  
that  neuroscience  has  yet  to  come  up  with  adequate  strategies  and  methods  as  to  
how  free  will  can  be  studied.  
   The   problem   illustrated   in   the   last   section   concerns   problems   for   society  
from  debates  about  free  will.  The  illusion  of  free  will  (should  it  be  proven)  would  
perhaps  not  cause  problems  for  legal  responsibility.  Instead  there  is  an  immediate  
and   observable   threat   in   incomplete   discussions   and   premature   conclusions,  
because  they  may  tempt  a  less  critical  audience  to  abandon  the  concept  of  moral  
responsibility,  as  has  been  shown  to  be  the  case  in  several  studies.  
for  this  is  patience,  well-­‐working  interdisciplinary  teamwork  and  mutual  respect  of  
philosophers  and  neuroscientists  as  equal  partners  in  this  discussion.  In  addition,  
regard  to  their  respective   limitations.  If  this  succeeds,  eventually,  a  consensus  on  
then,  necessary  caution  should  accompany  discussions  to  protect  society.  
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